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Philip Merlan

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TIME CONSCIOUSNESS IN HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER¹

Husserl's *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*,² though delivered in the years 1904 to 1910, were published as late as 1928, whereas Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*³ appeared in 1927. True, essential results of Husserl's lectures are to be found in his *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*,⁴ which were published in 1913, i.e., previous to Heidegger's book; but here they are so compressed that their full significance can be hardly grasped without reference to Husserl's *Vorlesungen*. Thus, as a result, perhaps no sufficient attention is paid to the relation between Husserl's and Heidegger's concepts of time and time consciousness.⁵ And yet, the fact that those *Vorlesungen* of Husserl's were edited by Heidegger himself, indicates their importance for Heidegger clearly. One of the assertions of this paper will be, indeed, that the roots of some of Heidegger's most important ideas can be found in them; nay, that they yield some of the fundamentals, without which Heidegger's philosophy would be highly speculative. The notion of the *a priori* in Kant,⁶ Schelling's speculations on freedom,⁷ the notion of subjectivity and the interpretation of time in Kierkegaard⁸ are other important historic elements, entering into Heidegger's philosophy, but this paper will confine itself to Husserl.

¹For his kind help in correcting the English of part of this paper I am indebted to Prof. Neal W. Klausner, Grinnell College. However, the responsibility for the ultimate redaction rests everywhere on me alone.

²(*Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, IX, pp. 367-498). Subsequently quoted as *Vorlesungen*. On the unique role of this among other works of Husserl cf. L. Landgrebe, "The World as a Phenomenological Problem," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, I, p. 57.

³Subsequently quoted as *Sein*.

⁴Particularly in par. 81 f. Subsequently quoted as *Ideas*.

⁵Although for example Fritz Heinemann, *Neue Wege der Philosophie* (Leipzig, 1929), p. 385, n. 12 calls to our attention that Heidegger's time analysis presupposes that of Husserl.

⁶For this point of view cf. M. Cerf, "An Approach to Heidegger's Ontology," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, I (1940), pp. 182-190, and W. H. Werkmeister, "An Introduction to Heidegger's 'Existenzialphilosophie'," *Ibid.*, II (1941), pp. 82-84. In M. Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (subsequently quoted as *Kant*) cf. part. par. 16.

⁷Cf. M. Beck, "Kritik der Schelling-Heidegger-Jasperschen Philosophie," *Philosophische Hefte*, IV (1934), pp. 97-164; E. Frank, *Journal of Philosophy*, XXXVIII (1941), pp. 678 f.

⁸Cf. my paper, "Towards the Understanding of Kierkegaard," *The Journal of Religion*, XXIII (1943), pp. 77-90; see also W. Gent, *Die Raum-Zeit-Philosophie des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Bonn, 1930), pp. 357 f.

The method applied will be: to interpret Husserl by Heidegger⁹ and Heidegger by Husserl.¹⁰ The result, thus, is likely to be "unorthodox" both from Husserl's and Heidegger's point of view. For, as is known, Husserl repudiated Heidegger's philosophy as a new brand of psychologism, a transcendental one.¹¹ But the hope is expressed that even where this paper will deviate from Husserl, or from Heidegger, or from both, still the results will be "orthodox" from the point of view of the phenomena themselves.¹²

One of the aims of Husserl's *Vorlesungen* is to analyze the structure of those acts of our consciousness, in and by which something is perceived as a temporal event.¹³ Let us try to reproduce such an analysis of Husserl's.¹⁴

Let us assume that we hear a tone sounding, say the tone *a*. I hear that tone as an event in time,¹⁵ beginning, continuing, ending. But to begin, to continue, to end, are objective qualities, attributed to the tone

⁹It is mainly this by which my presentation of Husserl's views on time differs from that of V. J. McGill (*Journal of Philosophy* XXVII, 1930, pp. 537-544) and M. Farber (*Ibidem*, pp. 337-347, and in his *The Foundation of Phenomenology*, Cambridge, 1943). In the last named work Farber treats *Vorlesungen* on pp. 511-521. The presentation is excellent, some reservations only natural. For, of the three interpretations of phenomenology, the realistic, the idealistic, and the methodological, Farber prefers the methodological. (On these three interpretations see T. Celms, *Der phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls*, Riga, 1928). But the *Vorlesungen* obviously have a strong idealistic penchant; and, indeed, better than any other writing of Husserl's prove that phenomenology necessarily leads to idealism.

¹⁰In other words, against Carlos Astrada, *Idealismo fenomenológico y metafísica existencial* (Buenos Aires, 1936), I, indeed, interpret Heidegger's philosophy as a development of the original phenomenological system (p. 119). It is characteristic that Astrada never quotes Husserl's *Vorlesungen*. I disagree also with F. Muth, *Edmund Husserl und Martin Heidegger in ihrer Phänomenologie und Weltanschauung* (1931), who, on p. 63, asserts that Husserl's concepts of retention and protention do not occur in Heidegger; this is true for the words only, not for the concepts themselves.

¹¹E. Husserl, "Nachwort zu meinen Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie" (*Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, XI, pp. 549-570), 1930, pp. 1 ff. (549 ff.), 10 (558).

¹²In the following quotations from Husserl (*Vorlesungen*) and Heidegger (*Sein*) the first number indicates the paragraph, the second, its section.

¹³It is true, while we perceive something as a temporal event through certain acts, these and all other acts (whether they perceive temporal events or not), constitute themselves as temporal acts. But the analysis of this temporal self-constitution and all the problems connected with it is beyond the scope of the present paper. Cf. Husserl, *Erfahrung und Urteil* (Prag, 1939), quoted subsequently as *Erfahrung*, par. 42c and 64a.

¹⁴*Vorlesungen* par. 1, 4: par. 2, 2. Cf. also *Erfahrung*, par. 8 and 23.

¹⁵*Vorlesungen*, par. 9, 3.

itself. We, however, are interested in the structure of our *perception* of the tone as an event in time. What kind of structure is it?

Part of the tone is originally given in the modus of being present now, and this "being present now" is a particular modus of givenness.¹⁶ But in order to perceive something as a temporal *event* (not merely as being in time), it is insufficient to have it given in this modus alone. For, every sense perception gives its objects in the modus "now,"¹⁷ but by no means is every object given in the modus "now" given as a temporal *event*. If we look around, we perceive different objects the original givenness of which contains that modus "now," but we do not perceive them as temporal events. That, by which the perception of a non-event is distinguished from the perception of an event, can, in the latter case, be described as a certain kind of retaining the original modus of givenness. Namely, that part of "the same" tone¹⁸ which was originally given in the modus "now," is now given in another modus of original givenness: in the modus of "Having been heard just now," or just now having been given in the modus of now.¹⁹ While another part of "the same" tone is given in the modus "now," still another is given together with it in the modus "just having been heard." This act of retaining or retention is not an act of memory, i.e. not an act reproducing something. On the contrary, it is also a primary modus of original givenness.²⁰ For this kind of original givenness Husserl uses the term "retention."²¹ Thus, if we reserve the term "impression" for perceptions in the modus of "now," we may say that an impression of a temporal event must needs contain a retention. Without that retention no impression of a temporal event could be constituted.

This fact, the necessity of retention, can be described by saying that whatever shall become an object of a perception of a temporal event is

¹⁶*Vorlesungen*, par. 10; par. 11, 1.

¹⁷Cf. *Erfahrung*, par. 38. Why we must perceive under the aspect of the present is a particular problem.

¹⁸The reason for using "the same" in quotation marks is explained in note 28. The sameness, present in the act of retention, is present there only as an object of intention.

¹⁹*Vorlesungen*, par. 8, 1; par. 9, 1; par. 17; par. 39, 2.

²⁰*Vorlesungen*, par. 12 (Consciousness of the pastness of the tone distinguished from the perceived tone-apperception as recollection); par. 14, 2; par. 16, 1; par. 17; par. 19; Beilage IX, 1.

²¹Husserl, instead of retention, speaks often of "primary memory" (as distinguished from memory proper-recollection). To prevent circumlocutions the use of the word "memory" for retention will be avoided in this paper. Cf. W. James, *The Principles of Psychology* (New York, 1890), I, p. 630: "... the reproduction of an event, after it has once completely dropped out of the rearward end of the specious present, is an entirely different psychic fact from its direct perception in the specious present as a thing immediately past." Cf., *ibid.*, pp. 646 f.

necessarily characterized by the fact that it is bound to become an object of a corresponding retention. Whatever I perceive as present moment of a temporal event, I perceive it as that which will immediately become the object of a retention, while it is given as present.²²

To appreciate this analysis fully, we must bear in our minds that we do not describe time or objects of perception. What we describe are the perceptions themselves and their necessary structure.²³ Even God himself,²⁴ if he should perceive something as a temporal event, could perceive it only in the modi of impression and retention. The question, whether something that we perceive *as* temporal, is, perhaps, not temporal in itself, the question, furthermore, whether that which is perceived by me as *one* temporal event, consists, perhaps, of two or more temporal events, these and kindred questions are in the present context, entirely irrelevant.²⁵

Thus, part of "the same" tone is given in an impression and another in a retention. But that is not all. While another, a new part of "the same" tone is given in the modus "now," that part of it which was originally given in a retention is still retained—but in a retention of a retention. It is given or retained no longer in the modus "just having been perceived": it is given as "just having been given or retained as just having been perceived." And while this retention of a retention takes place, that which was given in an impression while the object of the retention of the retention was given in a retention, is now given in a retention itself. The impression of the third part of the tone is given together with the retention of the second, and the retention of the retention of the first, etc. Moreover, the retention of the retention is intentionally related, not only to the object of the retained intention as retained, but also to the object as having been given in an original impression. Such is the constitution of the comet tail of retentions, belonging to every original impression.²⁶

Thus, the following is an essential quality of a retention: whatever is given in a retention, i.e. given as part of a temporal event, will, as long as it is given at all, be given as an object of a retention of a retention. That it *will* be given in this way is co-constitutive for its being given as present now.

Here again we have a law that no God can change. Here again we do not assert anything about reality, neither of the objects of our perception

²²*Vorlesungen*, par. 11, 1; par. 31, 7; Beilage I, 2; Beilage VIII, 4-5.

²³*Vorlesungen*, par. 16, 3; par. 31, 9.

²⁴God as a limiting concept: *Ideas*, par. 79, 14.

²⁵*Vorlesungen*, par. 1; par. 2; par. 22, 1.

²⁶A comparison of Husserl's concept of a comet tail with James' concept of a fringe offers itself. But James' fringe is constituted by the accidental occurrences of one's personal experience, is a fringe of contents, not a structural fringe; Husserl's comet tail of retentions is constituted according to *a priori* laws.

in themselves, nor even of our psychic reality; we describe the necessary structure of an act of consciousness, of any consciousness, in which a temporal event would be given. A consciousness for which something like a temporal event exists, can perceive the event only in the way described above.

We see immediately that the same law according to which, wherever a perception of a temporal event takes place, every impression becomes a retention, every retention a retention of a retention, holds true in infinitum. In other words: the perception—every perception in which something is given as an event in time—implies a continuum of retentions. And, to perceive something as present, means to perceive it as the final phase of a chain of retentions. As long as no retention took place, there is no impression of a present.²⁷

We also see immediately that the continuum just mentioned, is not only a one-dimensional continuum, a line (impression, retention, retention of a retention, and so forth). It is rather a two-dimensional continuum, a plane. Namely, while one part of the tone is given in an impression—a retention, a retention of a retention . . . another, the so-called previous part of the tone, is given in a retention—a retention of a retention—a retention of retention of a retention. It is the co-presence of all those originally giving acts that constitutes the perception of an event in time. Thus, an original impression and a retention may relate themselves to “the same” part of “the same” tone—constituting, thus, one dimension of the continuum of retentions. Or else, an impression and a retention may relate themselves to different parts of “the same” tone, constituting thus, the second dimension of the continuum.

The identity, indicated by the expression “the same,” means, of course, not an objective identity, but only an intended identity, or identity as the correlate of an identity intention.²⁸

But so far we have described only one of the factors constituting the perception of a temporal event—and by perception of a temporal event we always mean the perception of something as a temporal event. There is, however, still another essential factor involved.

To become aware of that other factor let us assume that we have forgotten our perception of the tone *a*, and now are trying to recollect it.

²⁷Cf. notes 29 and 52.

²⁸Thus, original impression and retention relate themselves to “the same” part of “the same” tone, thus forming one dimension of the continuum. Or else, an impression and retention relate themselves to different parts of “the same” tone constituting, thus, the second dimension of the continuum. But that sameness is, of course, only the correlate of an intention, not an objective sameness. Cf. f. e. *Vorlesungen*, par. 30; par. 31, 3; par. 39, 2; par. 41, 2; James, *Principles*, vol. I, pp. 459 f.

Let us try to recollect our whole perception, from the beginning of the tone to its end.

If we do so, we discover soon, that this recollection can never be a *literal* reproduction of the original perception. Not because of any weakness of our memorative power, but according to a genuine *a priori* law. Namely, when we reproduce the impression of a certain part of the tone in our memory, this reproduced impression will be tinged by the memory of what followed, when we heard that part of the tone originally; nay, it will be tinged even by the memory of what happened from the moment of the impression, now recollected, until the moment of the recollection, now attempted.²⁹ When I hear something, I still do not know, what I am going to hear next; but just this "not knowing" cannot be reproduced literally, when I try to remember what I heard. And because this "not knowing" was, of course, not a pure negativum, but qualified my impression in a particular way, my impossibility of reproducing this "not knowing" alters the original impression.³⁰

Be it emphasized: this is not a lack of perfection of our memory. On the contrary, it constitutes one of the essential moments of memory. Could I really reproduce an original impression without the alteration, indicated above, I would have not a recollection, but simply another impression—a duplicate, of which I would not know that it was a duplicate.

To avoid any misunderstandings it must be stressed also that it does not matter, of course, whether my original impression which is now remembered, was actually followed by anything. Nay, it is even quite irrelevant, whether my memory is correct. If I remember something, correctly or falsely, if I remember something which I, in fact, have never experienced at all, still that which makes the act of recollection an act of recollection (and not, e.g., an act of impression) is this: that compared with the original impression or with what I imagine my original impression was, the recol-

²⁹*Vorlesungen*, par. 25, 2. Cf. G. H. Mead, *The Philosophy of the Present* (Chicago, 1932), p. 30 f.: "The novelty of every future demands a novel past." Mead's book contains many observations pertinent to the topic of this paper; e.g., the assertion that no perception of an eternal present is possible (p. 1), or that the present is history and prophecy (p. 23). Particularly interesting is his observation that in the very act of perceiving something as present, we obey the tendency to maintain ourselves, do so by adjusting ourselves with regard to the past, and display a selective sensitivity towards the future (p. 24). The concept of maintenance, if it only could be purified from its biological connotations, were a good parallel to Heidegger's concept of care (or concern). As to the relation of pragmatism and existential philosophy—which relation would become obvious, if only, I repeat, pragmatism could be freed from its biological bias and Darwinian heritage—see K. Jaspers, *Die geistige Situation der Zeit* (1931), part 5, section 2 (p. 146).

³⁰*Vorlesungen*, par. 14; par. 24; Beilage III, 5.

lection has changed the original act of impression in the manner indicated above.

To see all this clearly, let us discuss the last part of the tone *a*—just before the tone suddenly broke off.³¹

When I heard that last part of the tone originally, I did not expect it to break off in the next moment (such be, at least, the assumption). This "not having expected" is not only a negativum; it is a positive character of the original act of hearing. I did not expect that it will break off, means that I did expect it to continue—at least I expected it in a very vague manner. The existence of this expectation is revealed when we consider that we were certainly not surprised, when that tone continued.

But when I remember that last part of the tone, I know already that it will break off in the next moment. Thus, my expectation of not breaking off, which was present in my original act of hearing, has changed when I remember the original act, into an expectation of breaking off.

It may be that, in fact, the tone did not break off, when I heard it first, so that my recollection is wrong. Still, it is a recollection only, if according to its immanent meaning it reproduces the original impression with a change; if the recollection implicitly maintains that it knows now better, than the original impression could possibly have known. An impression is innocent, so to speak; and it is only by the loss of this innocence that a recollection is a recollection. The restoration of that innocence would by no means make a perfect recollection; on the contrary, it would exclude a recollection altogether.

But by changing the character of the original impression, memory reveals, at the same time, the existence of a particular moment in the original impression: that expectation which can never be reproduced in a recollection.³²

It is this moment of expectation which we have now to analyze.³³

When I hear a certain part of a tone, I know, *in a way*, what will follow.³⁴ Either the tone will become stronger, or weaker, or it will remain unchanged. Either the pitch will change, or remain the same. In a way, I know all those possibilities, and just my knowledge that any of them may become actuality, characterizes my expectation—an expectation, belonging to the very essence of the impression of a present event. That expectation,

³¹The following is, perhaps, a consequence rather than a reproduction of Husserl's ideas. Very often, to the analysis of time consciousness I apply the results of Husserl's analysis of perception in general, particularly the concepts of *pregiveness*, *world*, and *horizon*, as used in *Erfahrung*. Thus, the subsequent quotations from *Erfahrung* point only at certain analogies.

³²Cf. *Erfahrung*, par. 21a, 2.

³³*Vorlesungen*, par. 25.

³⁴Cf. *Erfahrung*, par. 8, 6-11. Husserl speaks of the known unknown.

obviously, has a certain range and vagueness.³⁵ It is just this range and vagueness which it is impossible to reproduce in an act of recollection; could it be done, I would have not a recollection, but rather a second original act of hearing. In my memory or as a recollection the reproduction can take place only by changing the original expectation: instead of a vague expectation I have a determined expectation, the determination depending on which of the several possibilities originally expected was (or is fancied to have been) eventually actualized, when I heard the tone originally. And the change in the expectation means at the same time a change of the original impression, now reproduced in or as a recollection.

This analysis of an act of recollection reveals, thus, the element of expectation, present in every act in which something is perceived as being a temporal event.

Seemingly, this expectation constitutes a link by which each part of the tone is chained to the part yet to be perceived. The meaning of this will be discussed instantly; but it is of tremendous importance to see that, at the same time, the element of expectation is a moment, by which each part of the perceived tone is linked also with the previous part. Namely, each subsequent part *is* a fulfillment of the expectation—"is" meaning of course, only that it *presents itself* as being a fulfillment. In this sense of the word we may say that every perception of a temporal event necessarily *contains* an expectation and *is* fulfillment.³⁶

Once more: this holds true even for God. *If* God conceives something as a temporal event he can do it only, expecting vaguely its continuation. To deny it, would mean the denial of God's ability to remember. And *if* God conceives something as a temporal event, he can do so only by facing his present perception as a fulfillment of a previous expectation.³⁷

We are using the word "expectation." But what is meant is obviously not the usual, conscious, explicit expectation—still less an expectation presenting us a thing in advance. It is an implicit and vague expectation. The term coined for it by Husserl is protention.³⁸ Thus, retention, protention, and fulfillment are likewise essential in the structure of acts in and by which something is perceived as a temporal event.

³⁵Cf. *Erfahrung*, par. 21c (open possibility).

³⁶*Vorlesungen*, par. 12, 3; par. 13, 1; par. 24.

³⁷Perhaps this is a contribution to the time honored problem of the contingency of future events. Cf. Aristotle, *De interpr.*, 9. It is possible, of course, that God does not perceive events as temporal, that He, therefore, does neither remember nor expect anything.

³⁸*Vorlesungen*, par. 14, 1; par. 16, 1, 4; par. 24; par. 38, 1 (here the term "not yet" is used); par. 40, 2; par. 43, 6-7; par. 44, 1; Beilage III, 4, 7 (here the term "facing and advancing" is used), 8; Beilage VI, 16; Beilage IX, 1. I must admit, however, that the role assigned to the potential element is more important in this paper than it seems to be in Husserl.

But the assertion that every perception is a fulfillment of a previous expectation still needs some explanation.

May we say that every protention finds its fulfillment? May we say that every perception is a fulfillment of a previous protention? Does it not happen very often that a perception, far from being a fulfillment of the previous protention, is obviously a disappointment? Let us take our tone *a* again. If, for example, after having sounded for a while with equal strength it suddenly begins changing its strength quite irregularly—are we not constantly “disappointed,” “surprised”? Or, if the pitch changes quite irregularly and inharmoniously, can we still speak of fulfillment?³⁹

It is all-important to see that what we term disappointment in all such cases is always a partial fulfillment;⁴⁰ that a temporal event can be perceived only in virtue of the impossibility of a total disappointment. Every temporal event has, to use Husserl's characteristic term, its peculiar horizon;⁴¹ and it is always within this horizon that a disappointment takes place; and just because it is always within this horizon, it is, in a way, always a fulfillment. We could express this by saying that we have to distinguish between a basic or formal fulfillment, which takes place always, and a grounded fulfillment and disappointment—namely a particular, concrete, “contentual” fulfillment, based on the ground delivered by the formal fulfillment; both the grounded fulfillment and the grounded disappointment being possible only within or in virtue of that basic fulfillment. He who perceives a temporal event, expects, within the horizon proper to this particular event, anything; thus, whatever happens, is a fulfillment of that expectation.⁴² If it were otherwise, we could not have a perception of *one* temporal event.⁴³

³⁹This question is discussed in *Vorlesungen*, par. 41, 3. Here, it is true, Husserl seems to answer our question in the negative. However, the next section (par. 41, 4) proves that we are entirely justified to say that any discontinuity is a kind of continuity. In par. 24 Husserl says explicitly that protentions “allow” the possibility of otherness or nothingness.

⁴⁰Cf. *Erfahrung*, par. 7, 1; par. 8, 10 (unacquaintedness is always a modus of acquaintedness); par. 21a, 1; *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, 2, par. 11.

⁴¹Cf. H. Kuhn, “The Phenomenological Concept of Horizon” in *Philosophical Essays in Memory of E. Husserl* (Cambridge, 1944), pp. 106–123, part. pp. 113 f; and A. Schuetz, “William James' Concept of the Stream of Thought Phenomenologically Interpreted,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, I (1941), pp. 442–452. Also in Heidegger the concept of horizon is all important; cf. *Kant*, par. 25. The Brentano quotation in James' *Principles of Psychology*, I, 240 is, as observed by Schuetz, particularly interesting from the historical point of view.

⁴²*Vorlesungen*, Beilage III, 5–6 (What is predetermined is just this: something will happen.)

⁴³Cf. Heidegger, *Sein*, par. 68, 5; par. 69, 9.

Let us then, repeat. Every perception of a temporal event is an impression, a retention, a protention,⁴⁴ and a fulfillment at the same time. Being a protention, it is and must be linked to the perception to come; being a fulfillment it is linked with the past perception.

However, it seems that this description does not hold true for the whole temporal event. Obviously two points of any event are not covered by this description: its beginning, and its end. When I begin hearing the tone *a*, I do not necessarily expect it; and if the tone breaks off unexpectedly, the silence following it is no fulfillment of a previous expectation.⁴⁵

If the above assertion were true, it would be tantamount to saying that the different temporal events which we perceive, are perceived as belonging to different temporal orders. May be that this sometimes actually happens. May be, that different temporal orders really exist. But this is beside the point in the present context. What matters is that we perceive different temporal events as belonging to the same temporal order or, as taking place within one and the same time. But whenever such a perception takes place neither the beginning nor the end of a temporal event can, *as far as its temporality is concerned*, raise any particular claims, distinguishing them from other parts of the same event.

This can be stated by saying that the horizon belonging to every perception is *infinite*.

Let us explain this.

If I hear the tone *a*, the narrowest horizon may be the one within which every *a* will be a fulfillment, every non-*a* a partial disappointment—namely a disappointment because of its being a non-*a*, a fulfillment because of its being another *tone*. Hearing the tone *a*, I expected either *a* to continue, or another *tone* to replace it.⁴⁶

But *a* is not only a tone, it is also a sound. That would be another, and a wider horizon. Every *sound* following *a* would be a fulfillment.

But *a* is not only a tone, and, therefore, a sound. It is, straightforwardly, also an object of perception; thus every *perception* will be a fulfillment.

But the horizon of a perception is obviously infinite. Whatever I perceive, it is perceived within the horizon of a perception, and is, therefore, a fulfillment. Whatever I perceive, it makes me expect, it anticipates another perception and that I *shall have* another perception co-constitutes

⁴⁴Cf. *Kant*, par. 32.

⁴⁵This, indeed, seems to be Husserl's opinion. Cf. the words "except the initial phase" in *Vorlesungen*, par. 8, 1. On the other hand, the words "a new interval of time which no longer is the interval of the tone" indicate that Husserl assumed no radical difference between the perception of one, and that of two subsequent temporal events. Cf. the second diagram in *Vorlesungen*, par. 10.

⁴⁶When *a* lasts too long, the expectation may be that of a change rather than of continuation. In such a case, the continuation may be a disappointment.

my present perception, just as, in turn, every perception of something as present is co-constituted by the fact that it *has been* promised just now.

In other words, the concept of fulfillment contains a formal component, because also the protention contains it,⁴⁷ and the way in which the protention contains it, is characterized by a word denoting the assurance of a *plus ultra*⁴⁸ as belonging essentially to every perception of a present event; an assurance making of both, unexpectedness and ignorance, merely relative terms—because this unexpectedness and this ignorance are grounded upon basic expectedness and acquaintance—or, to find a common term, on *pregivenness*.⁴⁹

Thus, every event perceived as a temporal event has its “before” and its “afterwards.” This is not so because time is infinite; as long as we are phenomenologists we know nothing about what time *is*; but because it can be perceived as a temporal event only as being a fulfillment, and containing a protention. Every recollection can prove this. Every recollection reveals a concrete fulfillment and by this reveals also the relation of that concrete fulfillment to the formal fulfillment, and, at the same time, the relation between the formal protention and the concrete protention. It reveals, therefore, the formal nature of the protention as being vague and empty, revealing, thus, that anything perceived as temporal fulfills, according to its own immanent sense, a previous, formal protention.

But if every perception perceiving something as a temporal event gives itself as a fulfillment, and as containing a protention, then *there can be no such thing as a perception of a first temporal event, and no such thing as a perception of a last temporal event.*

Literally, no such formula can be found in Husserl, it is true. It is, therefore, all the more important to discuss it and to show its objective correctness.

A. The meaning of the clause “perception of a first (last) temporal event” is, of course, completely different from the meaning of the clause “first perception of a temporal event.”⁵⁰

B. Our formula corresponds to Husserl’s assertion to the effect that it belongs necessarily to the essence of every retention to contain a reference

⁴⁷Cf. *Vorlesungen*, par. 24.

⁴⁸James, *Principles*, II 256.

⁴⁹True, Husserl seems to maintain that where the expectation is so vague that we simply wait for any kind of things, neither a “proper” fulfillment nor a “proper” disappointment takes place; see f.e. *Erfahrung*, par. 27, 3. But even the improper fulfillment is obviously a fulfillment of a certain type. Cf. Landgreebe, *op. cit.*, pp. 56 ff. who maintains that the full implications of the concept of *pregivenness* have been elaborated by Husserl only in relation to the temporal horizon.

⁵⁰*Vorlesungen*, par. 3, 3-5 (doctrines of Brentano); par. 32.

to a previous impression;⁵¹ to the effect, furthermore, that the original impression is but the endpoint of a series of retentions;⁵² that a Now, not preceded by something else is an impossibility;⁵³ to the effect, finally, that to the retentional continuum corresponds a protentional continuum.

C. The way, in which Husserl himself expressed the facts underlying our formula was even slightly misleading. He says: "... the stream of experience can not begin and end,"⁵⁴ and, in some connection with this, he speaks somewhat later of "vast metaphysical consequences" of these insights.⁵⁵

This sounds, as if a certain confusion between the conceptions "first (last) perception of a temporal event" and "perception of a first (last) temporal event" had taken place; that the endless stream of experience is an existing thing; nay, that something like a proof of the immortality of the soul has been found.

All this is impossible. Phenomenology, both as a method and a system of transcendental idealism, speaks of acts and their *intentional* correlates. The endlessness of the stream of experience cannot be an objective endlessness, because it precedes both objectiveness and subjectiveness. The phenomenologist can neither prove nor disprove objective endlessness; he even never becomes aware of it. He has to do with acts and their objects as intended; and he can discover the necessary structure of acts as a condition of their intentionality. Therefore the formula "There can be no experience of a first (last) temporal event" expresses Husserl's ideas much better than his own words that the stream of experience cannot begin and end. These words make the stream of experience into a thing—whilst it is the condition of thing perception. The true meaning of Husserl's words is that every experience of a temporal event gives itself as demanding an endless progress and regress, and is, what it is, because of this demand.⁵⁶ Should the real order of things be such, as to refuse this demand, it still would not change the structure of our experience.

Nevertheless, the implications of this phenomenological analysis are vast, indeed. Yet it is only in Heidegger that we can find them.

There can be no such thing as the perception of a first, no such thing as the perception of a last temporal event—this was one of the results of

⁵¹*Vorlesungen*, par. 13.

⁵²*Vorlesungen*, par. 11, 2.

⁵³*Vorlesungen*, par. 32; *Ideen*, par. 81, last section; par. 82, 1.

⁵⁴*Ideen*, par. 81, 8.

⁵⁵*Ideen*, par. 82, 3.

⁵⁶This refutes, I hope, the interpretation of the point in question presented by V. J. McGill, "A Materialistic Approach to Husserl" in: *Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl*, p. 242.

Husserl's analysis of time consciousness.⁵⁷ Two comments upon that result offer themselves almost as an immediate reaction.⁵⁸

Was I not born? And shall I not die? Is not this short reflection sufficient to prove that there must have been in our lives a perception of a first temporal event—even if I cannot remember it—and that there will be a perception of a last temporal event—even if I shall never report on it? That, therefore, there must be something wrong with Husserl's analysis? Is not, in other words, our finiteness⁵⁹ the best argument against Husserl? Thus one comment.

On the other hand: is Husserl's result represented above not simply identical with the contention that time is infinite? Not simply a disguised repetition of that well known and generally accepted truism?

Let us discuss those two comments one after the other.⁶⁰

To be sure, we know that we were born; to be sure, we know that we shall die; to be sure, we know that we are finite. But in what way do we know all this? Not in the way of our personal experience; on the contrary, my birth is something that I have forgotten already; my death something still impending, still expected. But obviously what is always already forgotten, and what is always still expected can never become an object of my personal experience. Birth and death are events perceived as events by which the life of others is limited, and only in so far as I identify myself with others, do I know that I must have been born and shall certainly die.⁶¹ In other words, I experience my finiteness as the finiteness of others, not as my own finiteness. It is not I who was born and shall die, it is everyman,⁶² and I am concerned with death and birth only in so far as I myself am just a particular instance of what everyman is. No doubt whatever that I am finite; nobody would deny it explicitly; but the attitude in which this finiteness is acknowledged is such, as to make my finiteness the concern of others.⁶³ In other words, the attitude in which I know of my finiteness

⁵⁷Cf. M. Farber, "A Presuppositionless Philosophy" in: *Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl*, pp. 44-64, part. 59 f.

⁵⁸For the following cf. e.g., Johannes Pfeiffer, *Existenzphilosophie* (Leipzig, 1933), pp. 32-37 (one of the best short introductions to Heidegger).

⁵⁹For the concept of finiteness in Heidegger cf. *Werkmeister*, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-87.

⁶⁰Be it stressed: the subsequent discussion of time and temporality is a very one-sided presentation of Heidegger's thoughts. Time and temporality, anxiety, care, etc.: all these notions can be understood fully only in connection with Heidegger's concept of ontology. But the discussion of that concept is beyond the scope of the present paper. Cf. *Kant*, par. 44.

⁶¹*Sein*, par. 47; par. 51.

⁶²By "everyman" I try to render Heidegger's "man."

⁶³*Sein*, par. 52.

is not in itself the attitude of being finite.⁶⁴ I may know and say that I am unto an end, but this knowledge implies by no means that I live up (exist) to my end. In my own immediate experience birth is something which has been, but is not any longer; death something which will be, but is not yet.

Let us try to illustrate this thought by an example.⁶⁵

Let us assume a line segment with its two ends *a* and *b*. Let us assume a point *c*, situated somewhere between *a* and *b*. If we take our stand outside the segment, we see certainly at once, that the segment is finite; we have an immediate experience of the points *a* and *b*. But now let us identify ourselves with the point *c* within the line. In order to experience *a c b*, I must get over the distance *c-a* or *c-b*. But if my steps toward *a* or *b* are in the ratio of, say, 1, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{8}$, and so on, in other words, if I act actually like Zeno's Achilles—perhaps by no means interested to overtake the tortoise—then I shall certainly never arrive at *a* or *b*. In other words, I shall never experience *a* or *b* themselves; I shall always be approaching them. True, in order to see the finiteness, it is necessary and sufficient to leave the segment and take one's stand from without it. Only, by leaving it, I would cease being finite myself.

Let us apply that example to our experience of birth and death. It would mean that I never experience my birth and death, although I say that I am finite. If and when I experience life as finite, it is not my life the finiteness of which is experienced, it is the life of everyman. If and when I try to experience death and birth in *my* life, it seems that I can never experience them; I experience them, at best, in the modus of having already forgotten birth and still expecting death. When birth was, I was not; when death will be, I shall not be.⁶⁶ Always *I* have already had time, and always shall *I* still have time. I can say that I am finite; but this does not mean that this saying is the adequate and proper modus of knowing that I am finite, and certainly not the proper modus of being finite. Birth and death are for me events in time, and as they would be the first and the

⁶⁴Cf. part. S. Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, Book II, part 2. cf. 1 (On What It Means to Die).

⁶⁵The example is mine.

⁶⁶On purpose I express myself so as to conjure the well known doctrine of Epicurus (*Ad Men.*, 124 f.): When I am, death is not, when death is, I am not; therefore, we can never have to do anything with death. The question of death is of first rate importance in Epicurus (particularly poignant is his formula: We all are poisoned by the mortiferous filter of our birth; *Gnom. Ep.*, 30); from Heidegger's point of view Epicurus' doctrine could be described as an attempt to prove that, because death always comes *after* we had lived, life in itself is, after all, infinite. Cf. my paper "Zwei Fragen der Epikureischen Theologie," *Hermes*, LXVIII (1933), 213-217, where I tried to interpret "mortality" and "immortality" in Epicurus in terms of quality rather than quantity.

last event in time, they can never become objects of my experience. Our knowledge of our finiteness is, essentially, a way of preventing that knowledge.⁶⁷

Thus, the comment on Husserl, from which we started, is far from being an objection against his results. The finiteness, of which we speak when we say that we are finite, is never the finiteness of ourselves; it is the finiteness of others. It is never I who was born, and never I who shall die; it is always the other.⁶⁸ As far as my life is concerned, my experience has never begun and will never end. As long as birth and death are for me events in time, they can never be experienced by me. Even if we pretend to know our finiteness, that knowledge is inadequate and improper. And this not because of our ill will, because of our unwillingness to face our finiteness—if unwillingness means an overtly voluntary action; it is because of the very essence of our acts, in which something can be given as an event in time. The kind of our temporal perceptions contradicts our knowledge of being finite. Although knowing, in a way, that we are finite, we exist, in a way, as if we were infinite. And we do so, not in and by acts of reflection concerning our nature, or in the mood of lightheartedness, in which we forget our death; we exist as such in every simple act of perceiving a temporal event.

But is it true that we know of our finiteness only in that indirect way, only through a kind of inference, in which I confound myself with everyman? Let us consider the way in which we gain knowledge of our finiteness—first, of it from after.⁶⁹ In what way am I aware of my impending death—aware in the proper sense of the word—taking into account that death, far from being a temporal event, is rather the end of time for me?⁷⁰ Is there anything bearing witness of my finiteness, of *my* finiteness, not of that of others? Or is my knowledge that I am mortal actually only the conclusion of a syllogism, the premises of which are: All men are mortal—I am a man?^{70a}

⁶⁷*Sein*, par. 81, 9.

⁶⁸“All men think all men mortals but themselves” (Young, *Night Thoughts*) I, Cf. P. Schilder, *Goals and Desires of Man*, (New York, 1942): Psychologically, we never die. Schilder’s polemic against Heidegger (pp. 92 f.), however, is based on a misunderstanding.

⁶⁹*Sein*, par. 52; par. 53, 13.

⁷⁰And thus, perhaps, of time altogether. That time “is” infinite, is, according to Heidegger, an unproved assumption.

^{70a}The syllogism would be misleading, at that. Recently Schiller reminded us that the major is, after all, only a result of induction, therefore, not universally true. Therefore, Schiller correctly states, it is by no means sure that I am mortal. Certainly my own death is needed to remove some doubt as to the validity of the major. Cf. F.C.S. Schiller, “Are All Men Mortal?” *Mind*, XLIV (1935), pp. 204–210.

The something bearing witness is what the Germans term *Angst*,⁷¹ which will be translated by anxiety in this paper. The German term *Angst*, introduced into philosophic terminology probably by Boehme, meeting us in Baader and Schelling,⁷² plays a great role in the psychoanalytic literature, and there, it is generally translated by anxiety;^{72a} thus, it is certainly justified to translate Heidegger's term in this way. On the other hand, the same term plays an all-important role in the philosophy of Kierkegaard, and Lowrie, after having given much thought to this problem of translation says Dread. And still a third term offers itself, the term "fear," used by Werkmeister in his paper quoted above. Perhaps it pays to spend a short reflection on the causes that seem to favor anxiety as the most adequate translation.

The question is not one of literary taste merely. Actually, explaining the reasons for our choice we shall be explaining the phenomenon in question.

Dread and fear have this in common that their object is determinate. But the mood bearing witness of our finiteness is characterized just by the absence of any determinate object. The object of anxiety is nothing—not death itself as an impending event—it is rather the pure opposite of any significance altogether, the impending possibility of the end of significance altogether.⁷³ And so it is perhaps significant in itself, that the English language almost refuses to give adequate expression to that dismal mood, suppressing or altering the full and perhaps original meaning of the term anxiety, although, etymologically, the term is obviously identical with the German or Danish *Angst*. It is even probable that under the triple impact of psychoanalysis, Kierkegaard, and Heidegger, the full meaning of the word anxiety will be vindicated soon also in English.

Thus, let it be repeated, it is anxiety bearing witness of the possibility of nothingness, and by this, of our death and finiteness.⁷⁴

But even if we admit that anxiety is a peculiar way of notifying us of our finiteness, even if we admit that it is a kind of notification preventing me from confounding myself with another person, preventing me from being what everyman is,⁷⁵—still we have to explain: How does the content of this kind of notification differ from the content of our ordinary knowledge which tells us that we shall have to die?

⁷¹*Sein*, par. 40; par. 68, 15–20. Cf. Heidegger, *Was ist Metaphysik* (Bonn, 1929), pp. 16 f; Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Dread*, ch. I, section V.

⁷²Cf. my paper, "Towards the Understanding of Kierkegaard." *The Journal of Religion*, XXIII (1943), pp. 77–90.

^{72a}See, e.g., K. Goldstein, *The Organism* (New York, 1939), pp. 291–307.

⁷³*Sein*, par. 68, 15.

⁷⁴*Sein*, par. 53, 15; par. 62, 9.

⁷⁵*Sein*, par. 40, 15.

The answer is that in anxiety death is presented to us in its full indeterminateness as to its *when* together with the full certainty as to its *that*;⁷⁶ or, from another point of view, not as an event in time, ending the extension of our life, but as a quality inherent in life itself. *Anxiety reveals that mortal life does not mean a life succeeded by death, but a life with which death is co-existent.* Anxiety expresses the mood underlying a well known medieval poem quoted by Heidegger and reading: As soon as man was born he is already old enough to die.⁷⁷ And perhaps even more impressively is the same mood expressed in the medieval "Right in life in death we are"—if we only take the words quite literally. Anxiety is the mood in which I properly understand myself as being finite; the mood in which I not only am finite but exist as such, live up to my finiteness.⁷⁸ I do this, bringing home, as it were, death into my life,⁷⁹ thus, facing life's and my own finiteness.⁸⁰

In other words, in anxiety my finiteness is experienced and known by me not as a quantitative determination. My existence is no longer something included between two points, something extending between two Nothings.⁸¹ In anxiety my finiteness is experienced by me as a qualitative determination.⁸² The Nothingness was not, before I was, and will not be, after I shall cease being; it is present while I am, is the very essence of my being.

But if in anxiety death is no longer an event in time,⁸³ can we still say that death is an impending event? Must not, what is impending, belong to the future, and thus, be an event in time?⁸⁴

The answer is that the kind of impendence of death revealed in anxiety, reveals at the same time the true and original meaning of the future. Future is not a part, a dimension of time, not something existing. Real future is just: to endure oneself in one's finiteness.⁸⁵

But instead of speaking of one's finiteness—which word may have certain premature theological or moral connotations,⁸⁶ it would be even better to

⁷⁶*Sein*, par. 52, 11, 15.

⁷⁷*Sein*, par. 48, 16. (Cf. Epicurus, *Gnom. Ep.*, 60-fr. 495 Us.: Everybody leaves life as if having been born just that moment.)

⁷⁸*Sein*, par. 65, 20.

⁷⁹*Sein*, par. 62, 2.

⁸⁰*Sein*, par. 74, 2; but cf. *Kant*, par. 43.

⁸¹*Sein*, par. 72, 3.

⁸²The use of the terms "qualitative" and "quantitative" finiteness and infiniteness is mine.

⁸³And, thus, no fact at all. Cf. O. Becker, "Zur Logik der Modalitäten" (*Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, XI, pp. 497-548), 1930, p. 545.

⁸⁴*Sein*, par. 50, 3-6.

⁸⁵*Sein*, par. 65, 7.

⁸⁶*Kant*, par. 39.

Speak of one's being a whole.⁸⁷ Am I a whole? And when am I a whole? Only after my death? Impossible. I cannot be a whole after my death, because after my death I am not at all. And in what way am I a whole, if, as it seems, my past is not any more? How can I be a whole, if, as it seems, my past is not any more? How can I be a whole, if a certain No more, and a certain Not yet seem to belong to my very essence, preventing me, thus, from becoming a whole?⁸⁸

No more and Not yet: the true meaning of those expressions reveals itself when we consider being-unto-death in anxiety. In my proper being unto my end I always am already my Not yet, and I always am already my No more.⁸⁹ I am both, means I am so in a proper manner. Not yet and No more reveal themselves as being not parts of time, dimensions of it, but rather as constituting my temporality. I have never been; I *am* having been.⁹⁰ And never shall I be: I *am* shalling be—though the language must be raped to express that being a whole I always *am* futural.⁹¹

Anxiety reveals my finiteness, offers me the possibility of becoming a whole in the proper, adequate sense.⁹² But certainly it does not make me a whole. Even in our ordinary way of life my being a whole must express itself in some way or other.⁹³ This will become apparent if we return to the conception of protention.

What is, after all, the role of a protention? To make the future, as it were, coexistent with the present. Though not in its material content, the future is always present already, and not only the next future, but even an endless future. But what is it exactly that is made coexistent? Is it a self-sufficient, self-dependent entity, called time or future? No; it is I myself who, seemingly living only now, am already ahead of me in every protention.⁹⁴ Expecting my death instead of anticipating it, I again stand myself in my finiteness, I again am already a whole before death will end my life.⁹⁵ Yet, while in anxiety I am a whole in the proper, adequate manner, in the ordinary way of living I endure my being a finite whole by hiding it

⁸⁷*Sein*, par. 45, 9-10; par. 75, 6.

⁸⁸The problem is clearly envisaged, though hardly solved, in Paul Weiss. "The Nature and Status of Time and Passage." *Philosophical Essays for Alfred North Whitehead* (London, New York, Toronto, 1936), pp. 153-173. According to Weiss, to be is to be incomplete. Shall we, then, say that we are complete when we are no more?

⁸⁹*Sein*, par. 48, 6-18; par. 65, 7-8.

⁹⁰*Sein*, par. 68, 8.

⁹¹*Sein*, par. 65, 19; par. 68, 9; par. 74, 8.

⁹²*Sein*, par. 50, 6.

⁹³*Sein*, par. 50, 9; par. 52. Cf. Kant, par. 38.

⁹⁴*Sein*, par. 69, 8.

⁹⁵*Sein*, par. 68, 5.

from myself. I acknowledge my finiteness by fleeing it.⁹⁶ By being always ahead of me,⁹⁷ I am, in a way, a whole, but I see it as a continuum, assuring me that I shall always be ahead of me. But death is just the situation where any kind of being ahead of me becomes impossible. Thus, in anxiety I am ahead of me by overtaking the possibility of an ultimate and radical impossibility of being, whereas in my ordinary way of life I am ahead of me by overtaking all possibilities just as possibilities.⁹⁸

But even in my improper way of existing as a whole, the true original time reveals itself. Its essence consists in my being always towards to . . . and in my being always away from . . . —both co-existing with my perceiving now It is not time that is extended; and there is no such thing as dimensions of time. I myself extend myself;⁹⁹ I myself am always ahead of me, am temporal, but not in time myself.¹⁰⁰ What would it mean if I would say that I exist in time? Would it mean that one part of me does not exist already, whereas another is not yet existing? No, that is never the way of my existence. I always exist as a whole—in the proper or in the improper way, but I always exist already as a whole, which means that I exist as temporal. My so-called past is a past existing *now* as my past-forgotten, or kept in repetition; my future is a future existing *now* as my future—expected or anticipated.¹⁰¹ There is no such thing as a track along which I travel during my life, occupying thus, by and by, parts of a pre-existing time.¹⁰² And just as I have never been, but rather am having been, and never shall be, but rather am shall be, just so time *is* not—it rather *tides* itself.¹⁰³ It tides itself in my extending myself towards to . . . and away from Because I am always a whole, being always ahead of me, time is not an existing object, nothing that can be found somewhere.¹⁰⁴

As said already, I can exist as a whole in the proper way, facing my finiteness, or in the improper way, hiding it. The difference in these attitudes can be expressed by saying, that in my improper attitude death will overtake me; whereas in my proper attitude I am free for my death.¹⁰⁵

⁹⁶*Sein*, par. 51, 7; par. 68, 3.

⁹⁷*Sich vorweg*. See e.g., *Sein*, par. 41 and 46.

⁹⁸Which means that the possibility may become reality for me. The possibility of death, however, can never become a reality in this sense of the word. Cf. *Sein*, par. 53.

⁹⁹*Sein*, par. 72, 8.

¹⁰⁰*Sein*, par. 72, 5. This, of course, is the most radical development of "objective" time.

¹⁰¹True, we must distinguish between the original and proper Now (the Moment) and the derived Now. *Sein*, par. 68, 6.

¹⁰²*Sein*, par. 72, 7-8.

¹⁰³*Sein*, par. 65, 16, 18.

¹⁰⁴*Sein*, par. 65, 13-14.

¹⁰⁵*Sein*, par. 53, 16; par. 62, 14; par. 74, 4, 6.

So far, only questions connected with death have been discussed in detail—my finiteness from after. How about my finiteness from before—my having been born?

But what is there remarkable in this kind of our finiteness? As long as we have spoken of death, we could be fairly sure that we would be understood by everybody, even if this or that of our analyses should be misunderstood; death and questions connected with it are everybody's concern and ever since a legitimate question of philosophy and a favorite topic of fiction. But is there any serious problem connected with our birth? Does our finiteness from before bother us even in the slightest degree? Is not our indifference for it used aptly by Lucretius¹⁰⁶ to convince us that we should be as little concerned about our not-being after our death as we obviously are about our non-being before our birth? Is there anybody who would take Calderon's phrase, Man's great guilt is that he was born, so often quoted by Schopenhauer, seriously? If one is a pessimist, he, perhaps, will deem one's being born a misfortune—but this, of course, has nothing to do with the problem of our origin.

Furthermore. The mood in which our finiteness from after reveals itself is anxiety. But can it be said that our birth is apprehended in any mood whatsoever—last of all, in a mood of anxiety? Is not it true that our knowledge of our having been born is simply an inference from what we see happening to others, plus documentary evidence?

And yet: shall we say that the impossibility to remember one's birth is just an accident, an empirical factum, that, in theory, memory could go back to my beginning, that my birth could be subject matter of immediate experience?

Bergson's and, much more so, Freud's treatment of memory have made us suspicious.¹⁰⁷ No psychologist, no philosopher will note that this or that fact of our life has been forgotten without presupposing that this oblivion must have some meaning, some significance. And the more important the forgotten fact or event, the less probable is it that it has been forgotten just without any particular reason.—Shall we, then, really assume that the impossibility to remember one's origin is something just to be registered as happening generally, though not necessarily? Or shall we rather ask: What is the meaning, the significance of the fact that nobody remembers his origin? That, in other words, as far as his memory is concerned, he has never begun? That, if he would ask his memory alone, he

¹⁰⁶*De rer. nat.*, III, 832 ff.; 972 f.

¹⁰⁷As far as the present problems are concerned, the summary of Bergson's theory of memory is: Nature permits man to remember (to have a conscious recollection) only that part of his past, which to remember is useful for the action demanded by the present. A summary of Freud's theory is: We forget what to remember would be unpleasant.

would receive the answer from her that he has always existed? What is the meaning of the fact that our abstract knowledge assures us that we have begun while our live experience implies just the contrary, refusing, as it were, to "perform" that abstract knowledge and incorporate it into its contents? That, in other words, as far as our immediate experience goes, I am infinite from before?

One of the first passages in philosophic literature, where considerations concerning this problem, are to be found is contained in the Confessions of St. Augustin. "For, what else do I try to say, O Lord, but that I don't know whence I came into this—shall I say life-in-death or death-in-life? I don't know. And the comforts of thy compassions received me; that's what I heard from the parents of my flesh (out of which and into which thou hast shaped me); for, I myself don't remember it Afterwards, I also began to smile For, that's what they told me of me; and I believe it because I see other babies doing it; for, I myself don't remember me doing it. And so I understood, by and by, where I was I used my limbs and voice I was full of indignation I avenged myself by crying. From babies whom I had a chance to observe I learned that such was their way; and these babies, unwittingly (rather than my nurses, wittingly) taught me that this was also my way. And now, my infancy has died and I live. But Thou, O Lord, . . . tell . . . : did my infancy succeed another period of my life that died before it? Was it perhaps the one which I spent in my mother's womb? For, I received some instruction on this, too, and myself observed pregnant women. What preceded even that period of my life . . . ? Was I anywhere or anybody? For, I have nobody to tell me this; neither father nor mother could; nor the experience of others; nor my memory. Doest Thou laugh at me because I ask such questions? . . . I acknowledge and praise Thee . . . for my beginnings and my infancy which I don't remember; and Thou hast left to man to divine about himself from others; and with regard to many things which we believe of us to rely on the authority even of simple women

"Now, as to that period of my life which I don't remember, regarding which I believe others, and which to have passed I divined from other babies . . . I am loath to count it as part of my present life because, as to the darkness of oblivion, it is like the one which I spent in my mother's womb What do I still have to do with that of which I recall no trace?"¹⁰⁸

As so often in Augustinus, it is not too easy to decide whether the tension and vibration of the passage is an emotional tension and vibration—he wants to confess everything, tell his whole life, but, behold, his memory leaves him in a lurch and so he is at a loss, where and when to start and by his very impatience to start prevented from doing so—or else a tension of

¹⁰⁸Conf. I vi, 7 - vii, 12.

thought—what is the source of one's self-knowledge, what are its limitations, and what the ethical implications of those limitations? But just this interplay of emotion and speculation is certainly one of the main factors responsible for the spell, irradiating from the *Confessions*. It is so in general, and it is so in this case. Augustinus tries to penetrate into the beginnings of his existence. To some extent he succeeds, but soon his memory stops. All men around him tell him that he existed before this stopping point of his memory. He existed, they tell, as early as in his mother's womb. And indeed, he sees the way in which others are born; that observation together with the assertions of his fellow men convinces him that he existed beyond that endpoint of his memory. This, then, this strange combination of memory, testimony of others, and observation on others, convince him that he must have a beginning. Was it the absolute beginning? Did he exist perhaps, before he entered the womb of his mother? And shall he compute only that part of his life as truly his, which he can remember?

All those reflections show that, indeed, our knowledge of our finiteness from before is, in a way, problematic. Is it truly the result of all those elements?

To answer all these questions let us, first of all, remember that the infiniteness we are speaking of, is a qualitative infiniteness again. My beginning constantly recedes the more I try to approach it—and it recedes infinitely within a limited space. But by so doing, it prevents me from penetrating the darkness veiling my origin—in other words, the fundamentals of myself. Far as I may go with the help of my memory—my Self has been there earlier. That part of my self which I can master with the help of my memory rests on a dark fundament. While this fundament is certainly also my Self—yet it is that part of it which I shall never master and thus my Selfhood ultimately rests on an impenetrable, brute fact. I have to accept myself as being what I am because of something of which I have no control. I am my own foundation,—which precisely means that I can never master the fundament on which I rest.¹⁰⁹ What we are at present is grounded on what we were, but what we were, is ultimately, inaccessible to us. By forgetting—or, if we prefer so,—by our inability to remember—we make our present rest firmly and securely on something of which we have no control, losing, thus, control of what we are at present.

We discussed our infiniteness from before in terms of memory—or rather its failure. But what memory does for us in the way of its failure, every perception of a present does in a positive way. A perception, in order to be a perception of the present, must give itself and therefore be a fulfillment of a previous expectation—no more. It is in this way that it also assures

¹⁰⁹In Heidegger's untranslatable words: Grundsein besagt . . . des eigensten Seins von Grund auf nie mächtig sein. *Sein*, par. 58, 15.

us of our infiniteness from before. And here also the meaning is: what I can perceive as being now, has already been predetermined in my absence, as it were. True, the predetermination did not take place in the material sense; there still is a wide range of possibilities; but it is this whole range itself, the whole horizon of my possible experiences of present events that has already been anticipated in the preceding moment. The present, according to its own immanent sense is always a present succeeding something else—and succeeding not as something linked to it externally; on the contrary, as fulfilling the promise contained in what preceded.

Translated into a "personal" language this means that in every moment of my life I find myself as derelict and having given up myself.¹¹⁰ The past is the chain of necessity: be it said once more, not in its material content, not because a causal connection between the past and the present—causal connections are of no importance within the scope of our present investigation and make hardly any sense at all so far as questions of the order discussed now are concerned—but because I know of no other present than of the one the range of which has already been predetermined. To perceive an event as present is to perceive it as being "exactly" what we could and did expect it to be (the meaning of "exactly" being: corresponding to a *vague* expectation). And as the same holds true for every perception of an event as present, the impossibility of going back to a perception of a first temporal event is tantamount to the impossibility of evading one's being predetermined by one's past.

Here we eventually discover what "interest" man could have to forget his birth, his origin; here we discover the significance of the fact that according to its own immanent sense the perception of a present is always only the endpoint of a chain of perceptions. The challenge to remember one's origin, to reach the perception of a first temporal event would be tantamount to the challenge to assert one's absolute beginning in the way of an immediate experience; and such an experience would be an experience of *experiencing oneself as absolutely free—therefore responsible for what he is*. It is the unwillingness to assume this responsibility that expresses itself in forgetting one's birth and in a time perception which, virtually, asserts the infinity of our time, or our own infinity. Both, the forgetting in a negative, and the time perception in a positive way, deny implicitly our finiteness from before and by doing so deny my responsibility for what I am. The finiteness, admitted seemingly by everybody by his recognizing that he was born, is never my own finiteness. In what way does this seeming recognition take place? The simplest way seems to be to state one's age; but, in truth, there is no such thing as *my* age, a number expressing a sum of absolutely homogenous moments that can be measured by hours,

¹¹⁰In this way I try to render Heidegger's *Geworfenheit*.

days, years. Insofar as I live in such a kind of time, I substituted for myself everyman and have, thus, transformed *my* birth, i.e. *my* beginning, into an event with which I never can be co-present. If birth and death are interpreted as events in time, neither of them is really for me. The "when" of those events, as expressible in and by a date, is never a "when" of my life; it is an event in the life of a general subject, of everyman.

Two historic digressions might be permitted.

The first concerns Bergson. A certain affinity between Bergson and Heidegger seems to me evident.¹¹¹ What happens, asks Bergson, when we replace the "pure duration" by spatialized time? His answer is: By this, for the travel of our own life, we substitute anybody's travel, thus living a social or even cosmic life.¹¹²

Here we have an exact analogon to Heidegger's concept of "everyman." Therefore, I hardly understand why Heidegger quotes Bergson in a rather condescending manner; and understand even less the way in which he interprets him.¹¹³ Contrary to his assertion that Bergson teaches that time is really space, Bergson's doctrine is that according to the way in which we live, either we spatialize our spaceless, original duration, or we avoid it. Even if we spatialize it usually, sometimes, in great decisions (corresponding to what Jasper terms "extremities") we may overcome that spatialization and mould, as it were, ourselves into that original, unextended I. The only thing which must be added, because it is stated in Bergson indistinctly is that by perceiving ourselves as spatialized we become spatialized, or according to Bergson's expression, unfree, while those great decisions are at the same time both, becoming free and seeing oneself as living in a non-spatialized time. True, many live and die, and have never experienced true freedom.¹¹⁴ All who have a past, live and die in this manner. For, what is our past? Something left behind us and present as determining us now—the crust—(an expression corresponding to Jasper's "shell") that replaced our true self; but in truth, we have a past only by and in our particular attitude toward ourselves. And insofar we have a past we are had by it: determined and unfree. All this seems well in accord with Heidegger.

The second historic reference is to James.

There is a strange passage in James reading thus:

"As the Creator is supposed to have made Adam with a navel—sign of a birth that never occurred—so he might instantaneously make a man with a brain in which were processes just like the 'fading' ones of an ordinary

¹¹¹Heidegger speaks of Bergson rather haughtily. It is difficult to see why. His indebtedness to Bergson is correctly stated in C. A. Heiberg, *Das Dasein des Menschen* (1937), p. 127.

¹¹²H. Bergson, *Durée et simultanéité* (1922), pp. 62–65.

¹¹³*Sein*, par. 82a, note 2.

¹¹⁴H. Bergson, *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience* 14 (1914), p. 128.

brain. The first real stimulus after creation would set up a process additional to these. The processes would overlap; and the new created man would unquestioningly have the feeling, at the very primal instant of his life, of having been in existence already some little space of time."¹¹⁵

The passage is remarkable, particularly when coming from the pen of the same James who so clearly explained the difference between a perception of a succession and a succession of perceptions. The "first real stimulus" by no means necessarily gives rise to a "perception of firstness"; the two things clearly belong to two different orders of events. Therefore, if we respond to a first stimulus by the feeling of having been in existence already (objectively, an erroneous feeling) it is by no means necessary to explain this by the assumption of a brain process actually preceding the first stimulus. Even if we are parallelist, all we have to admit is that to the feeling of having been in existence there must correspond some kind of brain process. Thus, there is something wrong with James' analysis; but what is really important is to see that James was groping for an explanation of the feeling of pastness without an actual lapse of time. Probably he was dimly aware of the fact that what he was discussing here as a somewhat fanciful possibility was an actuality: namely that everybody, at any moment of his life, even at the very primal one, has the consciousness of having existed already. Only because he has this consciousness, he can forget his birth.

It is, of course, no mere accident that James should discuss problems that seem to be peculiar to phenomenology. Not so long ago Schuetz turned our attention to the fact that James knew and approvingly quoted Brentano's analysis of consciousness; the affiliation Brentano-James-Husserl is therefore only natural. It is certainly historically remarkable that in Europe Brentano's influence on psychology continued down to the present, while in America James seems to be the last representative of this kind of psychology. The influence of Wundt obliterated everything else in this country.¹¹⁶

After these digressions we can return to our topic: the meaning of one's forgetting his origin. It is, we said, this forgetting which assures us of our

¹¹⁵W. James, *Principles*, I 641.

¹¹⁶It is characteristic that, in this country, Brentano's psychology is being discussed for the purpose of clearing up some tenets of metaphysical idealism: see E. S. Brightman, "The Finite Self," *Contemporary Idealism in America* (New York, 1932), pp. 169-195. It is equally characteristic that in a discussion of the finite subject birth and death are never mentioned. Are not these events in themselves sufficient to establish the difference, so emphatically denied by Brightman, between the empirical and the pure Ego?

As to the relation Brentano-James-Husserl cf. note 41 and Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen* II/1, par. 39, Appendix.

not being responsible for what we are. To experience our finiteness from before (as *our* finiteness) in the adequate way would imply the assumption of responsibility for what we are.

To assume responsibility: this is only another way of declaring oneself guilty, guilty of what one is.¹¹⁷ It is not this or that particular act of ours for which we have to assume responsibility if we are to experience our finiteness from before—it is just what we are—though, admittedly, we did not make ourselves.

Responsibility for something which we cannot help seems an ethically untenable demand. It resembles a secularized concept of original sin, and certainly one of the most forceful objections to the doctrine of original sin is that nobody can be made responsible for something which he did not commit himself.¹¹⁸

And yet, strangely enough, the idea of a guilt transcending individual guilt, a guilt for which I feel responsible although I did not commit anything, the idea of a guilt imputed to me, though not posited by me is by no means foreign to mankind even outside the sphere of Christianity and its doctrine of original sin. We confine ourselves to a brief mention of three instances.

The first is the well known Orphic myth. The Titans killed Dionysos, tore his body to pieces, and ate it. Zeus avenged the crime by burning the Titans up by lightning, but from the embers of the Titans the race of man arose, thus partaking in the crime of the Titans in the most literal sense of the word, having in their bodies particles of Dionysos' body. Here an aboriginal guilt is clearly imputed to mankind. True, the myth does not tell whether mankind has a sense of this aboriginal guilt or whether it is only by the revelation of the initiated that it learns both at the same time: its crime and the means of its expiation.¹¹⁹ But the whole myth could have hardly come into existence without somebody experiencing this kind of sense of guilt.

The second instance is a certain element contained in the myth of the Golden Age, and its offshoots.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷It is strange enough that in Latin *sons-ens* should have become *hic est qui fecit*—the guilty one. Thus the wisdom of language confirms the idea that to be, is to be guilty.

¹¹⁸It is beyond the scope of the present paper to discuss the theological implications of Heidegger's philosophy. Three papers by Karl Heim, Rudolf Bultmann, and Karl Löwith, respectively, in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, N.F., 1930, pp. 325-399, are devoted to this problem: excellent is the treatment in K. Löwith, *Kierkegaard und Nietzsche* (Frankfurt/Main, 1933).

¹¹⁹Cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, *Orpheus and Greek Religion* (1935), pp. 82 f., 130 ff., 165, 174 f., 183, 206, 214 f. Cautiously, Guthrie reminds us (p. 207) that "impurity" rather than "sin" (or as I say "guilt") expresses the mood of Orphic teachings.

¹²⁰Cf. Art. "Weltalter" by Seeliger in W. H. Roscher, *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie*, (1924-1937) VI, pp. 375-430.

According to Ovid, in the Golden Age nobody knew any shores except his own. In the Golden Age mortals were satisfied with what the soil yielded voluntarily, unscarred and unbruised by hoe and ploughshare. But the Iron Age changed everything. Not only a moral deterioration took place, but also navigation began.

The same feeling is expressed in Virgil's Fourth Eclogue. Describing the conditions of the coming New Age he says:

"Still there will be left some traces of our pristine fraud and they will command us to tempt Thetis with our ships, to gird towns with walls, to cut furrows into soil."

Can we deny that the tilling of the soil and navigation are activities for which we hardly will make the single arator and navigator responsible? It is obviously a guilt which the whole mankind shares. And here again: to single out navigation and cultivation of the soil as transgressions is certainly fantastic, but it betrays the underlying feeling of an all-pervading guilt—a guilt on which our whole civilization rests.

In this connection, also the Prometheus myth should be mentioned—particularly as presented by Aeschylus. By his theft of fire he made it possible for mankind to survive and now he is punished by Zeus. With whom does Aeschylus side? With nobody; Zeus is but an upstart tyrant, but Prometheus undoubtedly trespassed against him. What he is complaining at is not that he is being punished unjustly, but only that his punishment is humiliating—he is not treated according to his rank. Thus, it seems that also in the Prometheus myth a dark feeling is expressed that our whole civilization, made possible only by fire, is based on a fraud.

The third instance is Freud. According to him, time and again man indulged in one of his basic desires: to kill his father. And it is the memory of this deed which is permanently haunting our mind. What is remarkable is not so much Freud's explanation, as his assertion of an all-pervading, supra-individual sense of guilt.¹²¹

The existence of this sense of guilt has been expressed by Scheler in a particularly forceful passage.

"The anguish . . . , the nightmare that once gave birth to the myth of fall and inherited guilt, the experience of brokenness, of some incurable sickness of man as such—Strindberg's *Dream Play* presented it in a marvelous way; Kant expressed it by saying 'Man has been made of wood too crooked for a carpenter to produce something straight of him'—still hovers oppressively over the whole western mankind, even the infidel. And the 'great psychoanalyst of history' still did not come who would free and liberate the historic man of this anguish of earthliness and cure him—not of his fall and guilt—they are a myth; but cure him of that constitutive pres-

¹²¹Most succinctly in his *Moses and Monotheism* (New York, 1939), pp. 127-138.

sure of anguish which is the emotional and instinctive root of the specifically Jewish-Christian world of ideas."¹²²

Thus, we can maintain: the "interest" which I have in forgetting my origin consists in the avoidance of the task to assume "original" responsibility for oneself (or perhaps: for one's self). And just as we said that mankind always was dimly aware of its guilt, we now in turn maintain that mankind always made some attempts to assume "original" responsibility. These attempts obviously underlie all religious rites amounting to a second birth.¹²³ By repeating the event of birth, this event only now is really "taken" into one's life which, thus, is posited as beginning in an absolute sense—as my life from the beginning. That this re-birth is often connected with purification, which, of course, presupposes the sense of guilt, and contains a promise of forgiveness or reward in the life to come, is only natural. And just as re-birth rites present mankind's attempts to make up, as it were, one's absence at one's own birth, just so many religions contain rites amounting to the attempt to experience one's own death. One well known passage from Apuleius is sufficient to become acquainted with this. In describing his initiation he says:

"I came near to the borderland of death and I touched with my feet the threshold of Proserpina."¹²⁴

And even today, the last survivals of mystery religions, namely the initiation rites of secret or semi-secret organizations, of organizations imitating secret societies, and even of fraternities, contain elements indicating the symbolic death of the initiand. The usual explanation would be that the symbolic suffering of death is a kind of test, testing whether the initiand is ready to suffer even death for the cause which he is proposing to join; but this seems to be only a partial explanation. Here again we find the dim awareness of man that his death, this most important event of his life, should not be postponed so as to be never experienced in life.

The temporal structure of our consciousness is not anything which we "made." Neither are religious rites of re-birth and symbolic death "made." They are unreflected attitudes towards our finiteness.

Thus, Heidegger's theories concerning the necessity of "taking in" birth into one's life, by which taking in we undertake ourselves as finite beings and assume responsibility for what we are, although we did not make ourselves; these theories are a clarification of deeply seated desires of mankind as they expressed themselves in mystery religions.¹²⁵

¹²²*Philosophische Weltanschauung* (1929), p. 21.

¹²³For the following see H. R. Willoughby, *Pagan Regeneration* (Chicago, 1929), pp. 54 f., 65 f., 129, 131 f., 207-221.

¹²⁴*The Golden Ass*, XI, 23.

¹²⁵*Sein*. par. 60; par. 62; par. 72, 3, 8; par. 74, 2, 4, 6, 8; par. 75, 5-8.

It is only now that we can answer fully the question which we asked ourselves: Can we say that we apprehend our finiteness from before in any mood whatsoever? And the answer is that we do it, indeed. The fact that we had an origin is apprehended by us in a mood of anxiety: anxiety which both attracts and repels us to and from declaring ourselves guilty of what we are and thus experiencing our finiteness from before adequately. And we defend ourselves from anxiety most efficiently by the implicit assertion of our infinity from before and from after in and by the temporal structure of our consciousness. Still aware of the inappropriateness of this assertion man still feels challenged to "take in" birth into his life and thus to assume full responsibility for what he is, bodily and mentally (and also participating in an historic situation, for which he should not be, by ordinary logic, responsible, since he was born into it, but which he is willing to accept as his guilt and fate). He struggles with his anxiety in this way and he does so in the mood of anxiety; he tries to assume and tries to avoid responsibility and declaration of guilt.¹²⁶ Anxiety is "caused" by our finiteness both from before and from after; it is connected with our inability to be co-present with our beginning or end—this inability expressing itself not when we make our origin or end the subject matter of our reflections but when we perceive anything under the aspect of time.

Some may think that to treat the problem of "original," "immemorial," "universal" guilt in connection with, or as an aspect, of, perceptual problems is preposterous. Therefore, two things must be stressed. Previous to Heidegger, epistemological and epistemo-psychological problems were treated regardless of the fact that the subject of such a treatment was a mortal subject. Secondly, if a problem of original guilt exists, we should expect that such a guilt has "vitiating" not only the non-cognitive faculties of man (his passions, his will, etc.) but also the cognitive ones. If man has "fallen" (in the ontological, not in the moral sense of the word), also his intellect has. This means that not only the *contents* of his knowledge are affected or that his intellectual powers have become *weaker*; it means that there must be something radically wrong with the *a priori*, the very form, the very structure of our intellect and knowledge. Young, in a passage quoted by Kierkegaard asked: Are passions, then, the pagans of the soul? Reason alone baptiz'd? (*Night Thoughts*, VI) A great part of Heidegger's problems could be expressed poetically by a similar question: Are only man's passions guilty? Not also his intellect?

¹²⁶In theory, he could respond to this claim not in and by anxiety but in and by defiance (the classic expression of the defiant decision to choose to be what you are being the declaration of Shakespeare's *Richard III*, Act I, Scene I, "I am determined to prove a villain", or, Baudelaire's *Don Juan in Hell*.) But it could be shown that the mood of defiance is not original but derived from the mood of anxiety. The classic discussion of the concept of defiance is Kierkegaard's *Sickness Unto Death*.

The phenomenological analysis of our time consciousness clearly indicates that we live in a qualitatively infinite time. From here we take one more step in order to assure ourselves of the correctness of our time consciousness, and we posit the concept of quantitatively infinite time and bring our subjective, qualitatively infinite, and the objective, quantitatively infinite time, to a common denominator, so as to make our time part of a cosmic time. Thus, from being ourselves, we transform ourselves into instances of everymanness.

Here we also can come back to the question whether Husserl's time analysis does not amount to the assertion that time is infinite. We must answer this question in the negative. Time is not infinite—at least not the “original” time which was the subject matter of Husserl's investigations. It is finite, because I am finite and it is finite as it is the essence of my being a finite whole. The objection (“Is not time infinite?”) does not mean original time at all.¹²⁷ It means another kind of time; time which our daily life discovers as an object among objects in the world (i.e., as heavenly motion),¹²⁸ time having nothing to do with that peculiar tension expressing itself in protention and retention; a leveled time¹²⁹ consisting of void “nows” succeeding one another without any internal link. But this kind of time is only a derivative of that original time; its objective and quantitative infiniteness is derived from the qualitative infiniteness expressing itself in the chain of protentions and retentions. This qualitative infiniteness is borne, as it were, by my finiteness; accordingly, the quantitatively infinite time is borne by the infiniteness of a subject, which is no subject at all. It is a No one, and can, therefore, stand for everyone, immortal and never ahead of himself. It is only by confounding myself with everyone that I can discover that new kind of time. In this discovery I move away from original time and away from the possibility of existing in a proper way, namely in a way adequate to my finiteness, to my being a whole already now. My ordinary conception of time is an expression of my peculiar modus of being—a modus in which I have become an instance of everyman, hiding my finiteness and knowing death only as a biological event in time—which, ultimately means, an event which can never befall me.

And now we can try to determine the relation between Husserl's and

¹²⁷*Sein*, par. 65, 11, 20-22. O. Becker, “Mathematische Existenz” (*Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung*, VIII, pp. 439-809), 1927, based partly on Heidegger's lectures previous to the publication of *Sein und Zeit*, contains many helpful and simple formulations of some of Heidegger's theories. See particularly pp. 220-223 (660-663) on the difference between original and derived time and pp. 320 f. (760 f.) on finiteness. Interesting is particularly his distinction between everlasting and eternal life.

¹²⁸*Sein*, par. 66, 4.

¹²⁹*Sein*, par. 78, 4; par. 81, 4-9.

Heidegger's time analysis. 1) While Heidegger accepted Husserl's analysis of time consciousness he at the same time became aware of the fact that this time consciousness, though time consciousness of a finite being, is at the same time an implicit denial of this finiteness. From here it was only one step to the insight that a finite being is infinitely interested in the temporal structure of his consciousness. At this juncture, the discovery of the infinite interest, Husserl's "academic" philosophy turned Heidegger's existential philosophy.

2) Both Husserl and Heidegger are idealists.¹³⁰ To express the difference between their idealisms we could use the formula: The transcendental subject in Husserl is a "pure" subject; seemingly uninterested and pure also in the sense of being not vitiated.¹³¹ Heidegger's subject is a finite one, infinitely concerned about himself. Therefore, the temporality of Husserl's timeless subject is a matter of fact, to be described and acknowledged. The temporality of Heidegger's subject is the essence of his self-care.

3) It is Husserl's solid, phenomenological analysis of time consciousness which lends solidity to Heidegger's anthropology.

In a way, my interpretation was only an attempt to answer the question asked already by Misch: Did Heidegger succeed in synthesizing the "traditional" philosophy as represented by Husserl (the objective of which is to reach the being) with life philosophy (which denies the existence of a being to be reached in and by thinking, because the objectivity surrounding us is only the expression of the self-interpretation of life)? And can Husserl be interpreted as a life philosopher?¹³² Both questions are answered in the negative by Misch; I hope that I succeeded in showing that this negative answer can and should be qualified.

PHILIP MERLAN.

SCRIPPS COLLEGE.

EXTRACTO*

El análisis de nuestro conocimiento del tiempo de Husserl prueba que vivimos subjetivamente en un tiempo ilimitado. Por eso, no podemos tener una experiencia de un primero o un último hecho temporal.

Heidegger interpreta estos resultados de Husserl. Somos criaturas finitas, nacidas e mortales. El nacimiento e la muerte son los aconteci-

¹³⁰*Sein*, par. 43, 22, 23, 34-35.

¹³¹*Sein*, par. 44c, 9-11 (ideal i.e. non-empirical subject-phantastically idealized subject). Cf. O. Becker, *Zur Logik der Modalitäten*, p. 50 (-546). We could say perhaps: Husserl does not know that his pure Ego is finite and infinitely concerned about himself.

¹³²Georg Misch, *Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie* (Bonn, 1930), p. 10.

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mientos más importantes de nuestra vida. Pero interpretamos estos acontecimientos como acontecimientos en tiempo (primero y último); por esta razón no podemos sentir éstos como partes de nuestra vida. De este modo, negamos "modo obliquo" a nuestra finitud. Solamente la disposición de la ansiedad nos recuerda que somos criaturas finitas y nos demanda sentir nuestra limitación como una propiedad de nuestra vida, no como límites antecedentes y siguientes a nuestra vida. Esta experiencia sería equivalente a la aceptación de nuestra responsabilidad por nuestro ser, y el reconocimiento que somos reos de nuestro ser.

De esta manera, Heidegger transforma la filosofía académica de Husserl en una filosofía existencial.